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ABSTRACT
Performing both security vulnerability assessment and congura-
tion processes are heavily reliant on expert knowledge. is re-
quirement oen results in many systems being le insecure due
to a lack of analysis expertise and access to specialist resources.
It has long been known that a system’s event log provides his-
torical information depicting potential security threats, as well as
recording conguration activities. In this paper, a novel technique
is developed that can process security event logs on a computer
that has been assessed and congured by a security professional,
and autonomously establish causality amongst event log entries
to learn performed conguration tasks. is extracted knowledge
can then be exploited by non-professionals to plan steps that can
improve the security of a previously unseen system.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Information systems→Association rules; •Computingmethod-
ologies→ Causal reasoning and diagnostics;
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Most organisations are facing security threats exposed by their dig-
ital infrastructure, and given the increasing size and critical nature
of their business operations, there is a need to pro-actively identify
and mitigate security vulnerabilities. It requires expert knowledge
of the latest security threats and how they can be mitigated. Such
knowledge is in short supply but is needed to keep the system
secure. is paper presents a solution that can extract security ac-
tions performed on a system using only event log data. An event
log contains semi-structured information regarding the activities
within the system, generated by either a user, application or the sys-
tem itself [13]. Event logs are benecial for tracking (step-by-step)
state changes in the system. is paper focuses on nding causal
connections among security event log entries of Microso Win-
dows operating systems (OS) [14]. Identifying a cause and eect
relationship amongst two or more security event log entries can
help in determining what problem was identied within the system,
how it was identied, and what remedial action was performed.
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Security event logs possess information on pre-dened audit-
able security and conguration policies, and record events such as
login and logout aempts, permissions change, policy change, and
so on. According to Microso documentation1, each entry contains
a unique identier (ID), event source, user account, time-stamp,
machine name, and a brief description, which provides specic
information depending on the event type, such as failure reason,
error codes etc. ese properties provide knowledge that describes
what was changed in the system.
e aim of this research is to automatically identify related se-
curity actions performed in the system and allow non-experts to
utilise the knowledge to audit their systems. is approach intro-
duces an unsupervised learning technique for identifying causal
relationships amongst event log entries. e entries are modelled
based on their information and are used as an input for correlation
mining process. e generated rules can assist in identifying causal
connections amongst events, unsupervised and without program-
matically encoding knowledge. e performance and accuracy of
the proposed solution demonstrates suitability.
e remainder of the paper is organised as follows: the rst sec-
tion surveys ARM and causal relationships techniques; the second
section presents how to determine the causal connections among
security event logs entries; and nally, the last section includes
empirical analysis of solution using live computers.
2 RELATEDWORK
Association Rule Mining (ARM) [2] is a method of paern analysis
that is commonly used to reveal interesting relationships among
seemingly unrelated elements. e ARM process also includes two
key concepts, support and condence, to determine the most rele-
vant relationships [3]. e support determines the frequency of an
item appearing in the data, while condence is the number of times
a rule is found to be true. A commonly used ARM algorithm, called
Apriori, was developed by [1]. It uses support value based prun-
ing and prevents exponential growth of possible frequent itemsets.
Many algorithms are available that have improved the eciency of
itemset generation in Apriori [16, 17].
It should be noted here that the presence of association rules do
not necessarily imply causality. Many studies propose mechanisms
to convert correlation into causal relationships. A recent study sug-
gests that casual relationship can be dened by nding a measure
of interestingness for association rules using strong feature selec-
tion data [5]. e interestingness measure is a way of checking the
relation between items of an extracted rule and can be measured
using an exclusive causal-leverage mechanism [4]. Another study
presents the Causal Association Rule discovery (CAR) algorithm,
which integrates ARM technique with the cohort study to determine
1Microso Windows documentation on Event Logging and Viewing:
hps://msdn.microso.com/en-us/library/bb726966.aspx
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Figure 1: e visual time-line representation of D covering
a time span of 20 seconds.
potential causal rules in observational data [7]. Other research work
has been conducted to determine the cause behind certain system
failures [11], where correlation mining is performed on a limited
set of event log entries and uses time-series methods and rule-based
classication to create causal relationships. ese approaches do
not provide a suitable solution for identifying time-based causal
connections in data. ey either rely on manual input or works in
a constrained and predictable environment. Additionally, due to
lack of considering temporal aspects, the existing techniques are
unable to dene the origin of sequence of causal events.
3 MINING EVENT LOG RELATIONSHIPS
3.1 Preparing Event Logs
In the following discussion D is used to model the set of event
entries, where D = {E1,E2, ...,EN }. Here E is a double tuple E =
{ID,O}. ID is a numeric event ID, andO is the set of unique objects,
such that O = {O1,O2, ...,ON }. From the on-going example, D =
{E1,E2,E3,E4} where:
E1 = {{4567},{User1,Win7, Port : 53176,NTLM}}
E2 = {{1234},{User1,ReadEA, svchost .exe, IKE}}
E3 = {{2345},{User2,ReadEA, System,NTLM}}
E4 = {{5678},{User2,Win7,NtLmSsp,Winloдon}}
Initial processing is necessary to ensure that any whitespace and
special characters are removed to maintain eciency. In this trivial
example, each entry has 4 objects along with their event IDs. e
objects of an entry are separated by a comma and represent the
information such as username, OS, applications and network ports.
Each entry starts with the corresponding event ID. Events occur
over the duration that the system is running and they oen appear
in sequence, although concurrency can also occur. An sequential
example is presented in Figure 1 where the events occur over a
20 second period. Each entry contains a timestamp denoting the
time that the event log entry was created. e example provided in
Figure 1 is a synthetic example used throughout the paper to help
communicate the technical approach developed in this paper.
3.2 Object-based Rules
is section presents a technique to determine correlation rules
among event logs entries using ARM processes. e purpose is to
identify events that are likely to occur together using their objects.
ARM is utilised as a method for describing, analysing and present-
ing association rules (ARs) extracted from tabular databases [9]
that satisfy the condition of co-occurrence. ARM consists of two
fundamental steps that are taken to extract interesting ARs [6]: (i)
frequent itemset – nd the set of items that appears many times in
data and (ii) correlation – identify strong co-occurrences amongst
the frequent itemset. e interesting factor is discovered using
support (frequency of itemset) and condence (correctness of AR)
values [3]. In the following discussion, D is the set of event log
entries E and I = {O1,O2,...,On } contains the total set of unique
objects from all event entries.
Researchers have also demonstrated that ARM generates a large
quantity of rules and has a time complexity ofO(N 2)where N is the
total number of unique elements across all log entries [12]. Every
ARM algorithm takes minimum support (minsup) and condence
(minconf ) to nd all those rules having support > minsup and
condence >minconf . Although any rule with a greater support
and condence values is relevant [15], but they still might not be
interesting to the users.
3.3 Event-based Rules
At this stage, relationships amongst an event’s objects have been
identied. However, it is then necessary to translate these relation-
ships to learn connections amongst complete event entries. is is
done through a process of searching and counting the frequency of
object-based relationships amongst two events.
Object-based rules are in the form of X =⇒ Y , where X and Y
contains at least one object each. Converting them into event-based
rules requires searching the objects from both X and Y individually
within all event log entries. If one or more matches are found
between the objects of X and Y and all event log entries, their
respective event IDs are extracted and placed in the same order and
manner as of original object-based rules, hence forming a new set
of event-based rules (r ∈ R). e process also requires a condition
that the event IDs on LHS and RHS of implication must not be equal
as it would create unusable cyclic redundancy. In the continuing
example, consider the object-based rule {User1} =⇒ {Win7}. e
User1 is found in the log entries with event ID as 1234 and 4567,
whilstWin7 is found in 4567 and 5678. As 4567 is already found in
LHS, the event-based rule would be {1234, 4567} =⇒ {5678}.
3.4 Cause and Eect Relationships
e technique to determine the cause and eect relationships among
events is presented in Algorithm 1. It is based on time as any eect
should not occur before its cause events. It starts by iterating over
each event-based rule and split the composite (containing one or
more event IDs) LHS and RHS into individual ‘sub-rules’. For ex-
ample, if we consider the rule (1234,4567 =⇒ 5678), the sub-rules
would be; (1234 =⇒ 5678) and (4567 =⇒ 5678).
e next step is to determine the truthfulness of all sub-rules
from each event-based rule to facilitate the conversion of corre-
lation rules into causal connections. e truthfulness value is a
temporal metric, which denes the accuracy of causal relation-
ship as stated by Hill’s criteria [10]. It involves nding all indices
of event IDs, where they occurred in database D, from both LHS
and RHS of every sub-rule. Assume there are 200 event log en-
tries instead of 4 in the previous example. Considering the sub-rule
(1234 =⇒ 5678), the event ID from LHS (1234) might potentially
occur at E9,E36,E59,E73,E105 and the event ID from RHS (5678) at
Algorithm 1 Determining cause and eect relationships from as-
sociative rules.
Input: Set of event-based rules R = {r1, ...,rn }, where r =
(rx =⇒ ry ), and rx and ry consist of at-least one EventID
each
Input: Set of ordered event logs entries D containing 2-tuple of
EventIDs and their corresponding objects
Output: Set of cause and eect rules C = {(c1, tr1),...,(cn , trn )},
where c = (cx =⇒ cy ) and cx is cause, cy is eect and tr is
the truthfulness value
1: procedure Cause-Effect-Relationship
2: C = ∅
3: for all ri ∈ R do
4: rx , ry = ri
5: tct = 0
6: for all EventIDsx ,EventIDsy ∈ rx , ry do
7: ct = 0
8: PosEx = GetIndicies(EventIDsx ,D)
9: PosEy = GetIndicies(EventIDsy ,D)
10: for all (Posxk ∈ PosEx ) and (Posyk ∈ PosEy ) do
11: if Posxk < Posyk then
12: ct += 1
13: end if
14: end for
15: tct += ct/sizeof(PosEx )
16: end for
17: tri = tct/sizeof(ri ) × 100
18: if tri ≥ 50 then
19: C .Add(ri )
20: end if
21: end for
22: end procedure
E21,E43,E57,E88,E112. Aer both lists of indices, PosEx and PosEy ,
are identied on line 8 and 9, respectively. eir elements are com-
pared using a loop on line 10. Every time an index from PosEx is
found to be less than the index from PosEy on line 11, a counter, ct ,
is incremented on line 12. Aer the comparison is performed, ct is
divided by the total number of elements in PosEx to nd a ratio of
how many times LHS event occurred before RHS (line 15).
In the continuing example, ratio of (1234 =⇒ 5678) would
be 4/5 = 0.8. e same steps are repeated for remaining sub-rules
using an iterator on line 6. Aer calculating ratios of every sub-rule
in an event-based rule, their combined validity percentage is deter-
mined on 17. For example, assume the ratio of sub-rule 4567 =⇒
5678 as 0.89. e overall percentage of (1234,4567 =⇒ 5678)
would be (0.80 + 0.89)/2 × 100 = 84.5%. e algorithm processes
all event-based rules in this way and all those rules having overall
certainty level of 50% or above are chosen for further processing.
3.5 Forming and Validating Causal
Connections
is section describes the process to formulate cause and eect
relationships into a chain of related events. It starts by iterating
over all sub-rules (cx =⇒ cy ) ∈ C and combine the LHS event
IDs of those sub-rules whose RHS event IDs are the same. is
will output a group, G, containing the combined sub-rules. Each
member д ∈ G will have one or more event IDs on LHS linking a
single event ID on RHS. e reason behind this combining process
is to connect all events together, which lead towards the same goal.
Although at this point, the combined events represent unordered
steps to perform one or more particular actions. From the previous
example, д = (1234, 4567 =⇒ 5678), and in this case, G = д as
there are only two sub-rules in total. Set G implies that all events
from LHS (1234, 4567) lead towards a single event on RHS (5678).
e next step is to create an ordered set of events within every
д ∈ G, so that the sequence of cause and eect events can be
determined. First, nd those two event entries having a maximum
time dierence. It is assumed that those two events will mark the
starting and ending events of action(s). Similarly, identify the second
to last event based on the time that it happened before the ending
event and so on. is process will arrange the event logs within д in
terms of time, therefore dening the initial set of causal connections.
Referring back to Figure 1, it can be seen that the time dierence
between 1234 and 5678 is 11 seconds and 4567 and 5678 is 17 seconds.
is means 4567 is the starting point. Finally the wholesome causal
connection rule (also referred as chain or sequence of events) would
be (4567 =⇒ 1234 =⇒ 5678).
e next step is to nd the truthfulness factor for each causal
rule. Using the truthfulness factor, the causal connections will be
arranged in terms of time. Considering the ongoing example, rst,
the truthfulness factor will be determined between 4567 and 1234
and then, 1234 and 5678. At any rule, if the resultant value is found
to be lower than 50%, their locations will be swapped (replace cause
with eect and vice-versa). As the swapping process will disturb the
arrangement of an entire chain, the whole process will start from
the beginning so that the swapped event is inserted into proper
position in the sequence. is process ensures the correctness of
causal relationships. Moreover, the average truthfulness value of
each rule is also calculated to provide the validity of an entire chain.
4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
is section presents empirical analysis of the developed technique
using real-time event logs data. e event logs les are acquired
from 10 dierent live machines under the university’s network. e
Apriori algorithm was used for extracting correlation rules from the
event logs entries. A survey claims that dierent ARM algorithms
show similar outputs despite being fundamentally dierent in terms
of the employed strategy [2]. However, a study [8] shows that
the itemset generation technique of Apriori is beer in extracting
complete and correct rules. It also uses the search space reduction
non-monotonicity principle for beer eciency. is motivated
the use of Apriori algorithm in proposed solution.
Due to large number of entries in a dataset and multi-step con-
version process from correlation to causal relationship based rules,
the minimum support (minsup) and condence (minconf ) values
require careful selection. Dierent values were tested forminsup
andminconf ranging from 10% − 50% and 20% − 90%, respectively.
Finding the feasible values is an important for eliminating less inter-
esting rules. For this paper, the values are chosen asminsup = 20%
and minconf = 70%. ese values are subjected to change due
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Figure 2: Causal relationship rule from dataset-10 with
truthfulness value as 91.25%
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1 7,756 33 13,423,448 23 47 7 1.8m 89
2 8,254 33 6,629,475 20 43 6 1.8m 78
3 11,956 29 281,508,612 24 64 10 4.5m 84
4 9,721 32 29,597,902 23 70 11 2.3m 67
5 10,206 31 27,839,778 24 69 11 2.4m 71
6 13,027 32 1,132,135 41 101 8 2.8m 93
7 10,948 15 12,472,706 4 16 5 2.4m 67
8 26,008 17 714,287 11 17 5 5.6m 80
9 3,404 33 114,728 15 259 18 0.7m 95
10 31,729 20 778,354 13 30 6 6.7m 100
Table 1: Results from performing empirical analysis during
event acquisition and causal relationship mining processes.
to their dependency over the given dataset and frequency of its
unique entries, however, they were found suitable for 10 event logs
datasets collected from various sources. Future work will present
more generalised values and their implications.
Figure 2 shows an example of an identied causal connection
with a 91% truthfulness value extracted from dataset-10. It repre-
sents the sequence of events where an administrator searched for
the password-less user accounts. Upon nding such an account,
its management seings were changed. Following this, the user
logged into the account and started performing certain activities.
e number of event logs, correlation rules and causal connec-
tions alongside execution time (minutes) and accuracy are presented
in Table 1. e accuracy of causal connections is determined on the
knowledge of two human experts. A certain rule was considered
inaccurate (0) where both experts disagree, otherwise it was given
half point (0.5) if one of the expert agree, and one point (1) if both of
them agreed. Following conclusions are observed from the results:
(1) e number of causal connections are proportional to the
number of unique events and their objects; and
(2) Number of correlation rules does not impact the number
of causal connections and execution time.
It has been observed that datasets with lower accuracy contain
such causal connections, where a single event is linked to many
others. Another observation is that the solution does not create
causal connections where they are not present, regardless of the
number of entries in event logs. Four such datasets, originally part
of the testing, were eliminated from this paper as they did not
produce any causal connections. e object-based model ensures
that a causal connection is created only where there is a relation
among the properties of event log entries.
5 CONCLUSION
is paper presents a novel technique for automated extraction
of causal connections from system event logs without any human
assistance. e proposed technique is based on a scenario where
an expert performs the security evaluation or conguration on a
system, and every change is recorded in the form of event logs.
Identifying causal connections among such event log entries pro-
vide sequences of actions that expert took to reform the system
security. ose actions can be applied to other systems for increas-
ing their security. e proposed solution was tested on 10 event
logs datasets. Despite the event logs entries are produced in high
frequency and might contain large amount noise, the proposed
solution demonstrated that it can successfully extract the domain
knowledge and be applicable in practical environments.
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